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Introduction1 
Who are we at the beginning of the 21st century? We 
are a globalized humanity driven by science and 
technology no less than a tribalized humanity canni-
balized by all kinds of conflicts and wars based on 
oil, religion, and mutual exploitation. Who is the ‘we’ 
in this question? In whose name and by whom is this 
question stated? Based on what and whose values and 
interests? What is the self-understanding of humanity 
in our time? Whose time? Facing what challenges?  
We know today that the hominisation (anthro-
pogenesis) goes back up to more than 6 million years 
ago through various ramifications. Our family tree 
shows a deep and complex genetic intertwinement 
not only with other primates but with all living be-
                                                 
1 Keynote paper at the international conference “Information 
Ethics: Future of Humanities,” organized by the Oxford Uehiro 
Centre for Practical Ethics, the Uehiro Foundation on Ethics and 
Education, and the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International 
Affairs, St Cross College, Oxford, 8-9 December 2010. First pub-
lished in: Rafael Capurro / John Holgate (eds.), Messages and 
Messengers. Angeletics as an Approach to the Phenomenology of 
Communication, Munich 2011, 161-179. 
ings.2 The natural evolution of the human race or 
‘hominisation’ and the cultural evolution or ‘human-
isation’ are related but of different order. The dis-
tinction between nature and culture has become 
blurred nowadays not only because we have learnt to 
transform nature according to our needs and desires, 
but also because we are able to manipulate, change 
and even produce new kinds of living beings. We are 
in a process of transforming ourselves after having 
learnt – or believing we have learnt – to dominate, 
but in fact often to destroy nature in the name of 
man, placing ourselves at the center of reality.  
We live in a time of the crisis of humanisms that 
have a long history recently addressed by Charles 
Taylor in his monumental book A Secular Age.3 
What answers do we as ethicists give to this chal-
lenge that “calls for thinking”4 today? I consider this 
                                                 
2  See the eleven papers on Ardipithecus Ramidus in: Science, 
Special Edition, October 2, 2009. 
3 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Cambridge MA 2007. 
4 Martin Heidegger, Was heißt Denken?, Tübingen 1971 (Engl. 
Transl. What calls for Thinking?, in:Basic Writings. Martin 
Heidegger, ed. by David Farrell, London 1993, 365-391). 
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question to be at the core of information ethics as far 
as it concerns our dwelling or ‘ethos’ in a shared 
world shaped by information and communication 
technology. Ethics is a way of interpreting and trans-
forming our being-in-the-world.5 I call a compara-
tive ethical reflexion focused on information and 
communication technologies in different historical 
and cultural contexts intercultural information eth-
ics.6 Do we need a new kind of humanism facing the 
challenges of the information society? What is the 
difference between present and past humanisms? 
What is behind the discourses on trans- and 
posthumanisms? What is the place of humans with 
regard to non-human living, artificial and hybrid 
beings? These are far-reaching questions that need a 
broad historical and systematic analysis. This paper 
is a small contribution to the issue addressed by this 
conference concerning ‘the future of humanities.’ 
In the first part, I present a short history of 
Western humanisms. As far as these humanisms rest 
on a fixation of the ‘humanum’ they are metaphysi-
cal, although they might radically differ from each 
other. In the second part I point to the present debate 
on trans- and posthumanism in the context of some 
breath-taking developments in science and technology. I 
explain how angeletics, a theory of messengers and mes-
sages, can give an answer to the leading question of this 
paper, namely: what does it mean to go beyond human-
isms?7 The conclusion deals with an ethics of hospitality 
and care from an angeletic perspective. 
                                                 
5 See my first steps on these questions particularly with regard to 
the information age, Rafael Capurro, Leben im Informationszeit-
alter, Berlin 1995. 
6 Rafael Capurro, Intercultural Information Ethics, in: The Hand-
book of Information and Computer Ethics, ed. by Kenneth E. 
Himma and Hermann T. Tavani, New Jersey 2008, 639-665. 
Online: http://www.capurro.de/iiebangkok.html.  
7 My interest in angeletics or theory of messengers/messages goes 
back to my PhD on the concept of information in: Rafael Capur-
ro: Information. Ein Beitrag zur etymologischen und ideenge-
schichtlichen Begründung des Informationsbegriffs, Munich 
1978, 46-49. Online: http://www.capurro.de/info.html followed by 
several contributions particularly in the last ten years: Rafael 
Capurro Angeletics – A Message Theory, in: Hierarchies of 
Communication, ed. by Hans H. Diebner and Lehan Ramsay, 
Karlsruhe 2003, 58-71.  Online: http://www.capurro.de/angeletics 
_zkm.html; Rafael Capurro , On the Relevance of Angeletics and 
Hermeneutics for Information Technology, in: International 
Journal of Applied Research on Information Technology and 
Computing (IJARITAC), 2010, 1, 2, 233-239. Online: 
http://www.capurro.de/tsukuba.html; Rafael Capurro/Makoto 
Nakada, A Dialogue on Intercultural Angeletics, in: Messages and 
I 
A Short History of Western Humanisms 
We begin this short history of Western humanisms 
with Socrates’ critique of the poets that I interpret as 
the birth of philosophy based on turning over the 
communicational or angeletic relationship between 
the human and the divine. After some hints on 
Christianity and Renaissance, taking as an example 
Pico della Mirandola, I deal with Descartes’ human-
ism. The ‘new humanism’ of the 18th century culmi-
nates with the philosophers of the Enlightenment 
and particularly with Kant8 whose transcendental 
humanism I briefly analyze. The critique of human-
isms becomes particularly virulent with the social-
critical and anti- or postmetaphysical movements in 
the 19th  and 20th century, particularly with Karl Marx, 
Ludwig Feuerbach, Friedrich Nietzsche, Herbert Marcu-
se, Theodor W. Adorno, Louis Althusser, Martin 
Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Claude Levi-Strauss, Albert Camus, and Jacques Lacan.9 
 
1. Socratic and Christian Humanisms 
At the beginning of the Phaedrus Plato tells how 
Socrates and Phaedrus leave the city walking 
without sandals along the river Ilissus – it was a 
hot day but, in fact, Socrates apparently never 
used sandals – looking for a quiet place under a 
plane-tree where “there are shade and gentle 
breezes, and grass on which we may either sit or 
lie down” (Phaidr. 229b). Socrates praises the 
beauty of the place and points to the myths related to 
it dealing with hippocentaurs, chimeras, Pegasus, 
and the Gorgons. All these stories could be consid-
ered, according to Socrates, from the viewpoint of 
their probability (‘to eikós’) in which case we need “a 
sort of rural wisdom” (‘agroíko tina sophía’) as well 
as a great deal of time (‘scholé’). But he, Socrates, has 
no leisure for such enquiries. Why? Because, as he 
                                                                        
Messengers, ed. by Rafael Capurro/John Holgate, Munich 2011, 67-
84. Online: http://www.capurro.de/intercultural_angeletics.html  
8 Clemens Menze, Art. Humanismus, Humanität (I), in: Histori-
sches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. By Joachim Ritter et al., 
Darmstadt 1974, 1217-1219. 
9 Reinhard Romberg, Art. Humanismus, Humanität (II), in: 
Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. by Joachim Ritter et 
al., Darmstadt 1974, 1219-1225; Joseph Pape, Art. Humanismus, 
Humanität (III), in: Joachim Ritter et al. (eds.), Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Darmstadt 1974, 1225-1230. 






says, he must first know himself following the Del-
phian inscription. And he adds:  
[…] am I a monster more complicated and swollen with 
passion than the serpent Typho, or a creature of a gentler 
and simpler sort, to whom Nature has given a diviner and 
lowlier destiny? (Phaidr. 230 a)  
In other words, Socrates rejects being a mere receiv-
er and believer of mythical messages and divine 
messengers. He also rejects messages coming from 
nature. He says:  
[…] I am a lover of knowledge, and the men who dwell in 
the city are my teachers, and not the trees or the country. 
Though I do indeed believe that you have found a spell 
with which to draw me out of the city into the country, 
like a hungry cow before whom a bough or a bunch of 
fruit is waved. For only hold up before me in like manner a 
book (‘biblíois’), and you may lead me all round Attica, 
and over the wide world. And now having arrived, I intend 
to lie down, and you should choose any posture in which 
you can read best. (Phaidr. 230d-e)  
This provokes the following astonishing comment 
by Phaedrus:  
[…] What an incomprehensible being (‘atopótatos’) you 
are, Socrates: when you are in the country, as you say, you 
really are like some stranger who is led about by a guide. 
Do you ever cross the border? I rather think that you never 
venture even outside the gates. (Phaidr. 230b-d) 
In the dialogue Ion Socrates explains his critique of 
the myths as transmitted by poets and rhapsodes, 
particularly by the Homerides. Poets transmit mes-
sages coming from the god who is “the one who 
really speaks” (Ion 534d). They are just hermeneuti-
cists (‘hermenés’) or interpreters of the god(s) and 
the muses “getting inspired and possessed by them” 
(Ion 534e), passing on their messages through the 
rhapsodes. Socrates opposes ‘knowledge’ (‘téchne’) 
acquired through a horizontal and critical dialogue 
to vertical message transmission performed by the 
poets guided not by reason (nous) but by divine 
inspiration (‘theia moira’). The messengers of the gods 
do not have knowledge of the matters they deal with and 
they are not free, that is to say, they are possessed by the 
gods, not being in their right mind and being able to 
produce similar effects ”on most of the spectators” (Ion 
535d). He compares them with a magnetic stone:  
This stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to 
them a similar power of attracting other rings; and some-
times you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings 
suspended from one another so as to form a quite long 
chain: and all of them derive their power of suspension 
from the original stone. (Ion 533d)  
Socrates praises the horizontal and bottom-up ‘logos’ 
of philosophy opposing it to the god-inspired verti-
cal message transmission. Plato avoids in most of his 
dialogues the word ‘angelía’ – except in its colloquial 
use – that as a ‘terminus technicus’ was deeply rooted 
in the contexts of myth, poetry, and political power. 
It is through dialogical reason, particularly in its oral 
form (‘logos’) – the Phaidros provides with the myth 
of the Egyptian god Theuth, the inventor of writing, 
and its Greek equivalent Hermes, the first media 
critique of Western philosophy (Phaidr. 274c-275b – 
that humans can go ‘beyond’ their mortal condition 
and not by way of the myths and their intermediar-
ies. Socrates’ humanism is a bottom-up theocen-
trism. Contrary to mythical theocentrism, god is a 
higher intellect and not a magnet force that “ways 
the souls of men in any direction” (Ion 536 a). The 
vertical, heteronomic, top-down poetic practice is 
substituted by a horizontal bottom-up dialogue 
guided by reason. The philosopher is a messenger 
that passes on (‘dia’) ideas through the medium of 
the critical and autonomous ‘logos’ instead of pro-
claiming a mythical truth coming from above. Phi-
losophy is born out of this angeletic turn concerning the 
relation between sender, messenger, message and receiv-
er. It implies a new information ethics based on dialogue 
and reasoning striving beyond nature towards the meta-
physical divine. It is a metaphysical humanism.  
Christianity combined paradoxically the heter-
onomic concept of message (‘angelía’) as the ‘good 
news’ (‘euangelion’) coming from above with the 
autonomous ‘logos’ of philosophy by turning the 
latter into an instrument for understanding and 
distributing the holy message.10 This is eventually 
possible because of the double nature, divine and hu-
man, of the messenger, Jesus, who is the ‘good news’ – 
without being himself an angel – and the ‘logos’. The 
Roman Catholic Church claims to be the only legiti-
mate messenger and interpreter of the ‘good news.’  
This claim was questionned by Martin Luther 
(1483-1546). The Reformation gave the Christian 
believer a theoretical and practical angeletic auton-
omy not only thanks to the translation of the Bible 
                                                 
10 See Rafael Capurro, Information. Ein Beitrag zur etymologi-
schen und ideengeschichtlichen Begründung des Informationsbe-
griffs, Munich 1978, 46-49. Online: http://www.capurro.de/ 
info.html; ibid.: Leben im Informationszeitalter, Berlin 1995, 99. 






into German – vernacular translations had been 
done already, for instance, of the Hebrew Bible into 
Greek by the Septuaginta (LXX) or into Latin with 
the Vulgata – but also by proclaiming the autonomy 
of the individual receiver and believer as a legitimate 
interpreter of the ‘good news.’ The believer and 
receiver of the Christian message becomes a critical 
sender. At the same time, Christian humanisms keep 
and proclaim the movement beyond the human 
towards the divine. They are religious humanisms. 
The autonomy of the religious receiver has also politi-
cal implications by giving individuals the legitimacy 
for questioning any message and messenger coming 
from above and claiming absolute truth without al-
lowing critical and autonomous self-reflection as well 
as the possibility of becoming a sender. 
 
2. Humanisms in Renaissance and Modernity 
Humanists in the 15th and 16th century looked back 
to the Greek and Roman tradition. In his Oration on the 
Dignity of Man (De hominis dignitate) Giovanni Pico 
della Mirandola (1463-1494) answers the question about 
humanity’s place in the “chain of being”11 by stating  
[…] that man is the intermediary between creatures (“cre-
aturarum internuntium”), that he is the familiar of the 
gods above him as he is the lord of the beings beneath him; 
that, by the acuteness of his senses, the inquiry of his 
reason and the light of his intelligence, he is the interpreter 
of nature, set midway between (“interstitium”) the timel-
ess unchanging and the flux of time; the living union (as 
the Persians say), the very marriage hymn of the world, 
and, by David's testimony but little lower than the angels.12  
For Pico, human dignity is based on this metaphysi-
cal beyond from where the true messages come that 
we as intermediaries should emulate: 
Let us not even yield place to them, the highest of the 
angelic orders, and not be content with a lower place, 
imitate them in all their glory and dignity (“et dignitatem 
et gloriam aemulemur”). If we choose to, we will not be 
second to them in anything.13 
Pico’s answer to the question of how to achieve an 
“angelic life” is a Christian and Socratic one, namely 
through the study of philosophy and the practical 
emulation of this angelic ideal. Our dignity consists 
                                                 
11 Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the 
History of an Idea, Harvard 1964. 
12 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, De hominis dignitate. Über die 
Würde des Menschen, Hamburg 1990, 2. 
13 Ibid., 10. 
in this capacity of self-transformation through liber-
al arts (“per artem sermocinalem sive rationariam”), 
that leads us beyond earthly life. This intellectual 
activity makes the big difference between the blind 
activity of the poetic messengers criticized by Socra-
tes and the intellectual nature of the angels travers-
ing in ascensions and descents the ladder of Jacob 
(Genesis 28, 12ss).14 Humans are located between 
animals and angels. This is a classic philosophical 
and theological topos. It was used by humanists like 
Herder as well as by authors like Pascal, Montaigne, 
and Paul Valéry. It comes back today within a tech-
nological framework with the idea of a super-
intelligent computer in the 1970s as well as in some 
transhumanist speculations. Humans are then in-
between animals and an artificial super-intelligence.15 
While in Renaissance and Reformation human-
isms are mostly theocentric, modern humanisms like 
the ones of Descartes and Kant are anthropocentric 
or, more precisely, reason-centered. René Descartes 
(1596-1650) was educated at the Jesuit school of La 
Flèche. In winter 1619 when he was in the German 
city of Ulm he had a dream dealing with the ques-
tion: “Which kind [way] of life shall I choose?” 
(“Quod vitae sectabor iter?”),16 a quotation from the 
Latin poet Ausonius (ca. 310-393). This ethical ques-
tion is typical of the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of 
Loyola (1491-1556), the founder of the Jesuit Order. 
Descartes performs a secular twisting of the religious 
practices of the Jesuits. Descartes’ Rules for the Direc-
tion of the Mind (Regulae ad directionem ingenii) are 
the basis of his scientific methodology. They concern 
the education of the scientific spirit in a similar way 
as Ignatius of Loyola developed his Rules for the 
Discernment of Spirits in the Spiritual Exercises based 
on a religious “Principle and Foundation” that states: 
“Man is created to praise, reverence, and serve God 
our Lord, and by this means to save his soul.”17 Des-
cartes’ first three rules read: 
Rule I The aim of our studies must be the direction of our 
mind so that it may form solid and true judgments on 
whatever matters arise. 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 14. 
15 See Rafael Capurro, Leben im Informationszeitalter, Berlin 
1995, 78. 
16 René Descartes, Oeuvres, ed. By Charles Adam and Paul Tan-
nery, Paris 1996, X, 179. 
17 Ignatius of Loyola, The Spiritual Exercises (Transl. E. Mullan, 
S.J.) 1914. Online: 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/ignatius/exercises.titlepage.html  






Rule II We must occupy ourselves only with those objects 
that our intellectual powers appear competent to know 
certainly and indubitably. 
Rule III As regards any subject we propose to investigate, 
we must inquire not what other people have thought, or 
what we ourselves conjecture, but what we can clearly and 
manifestly perceive by intuition or deduce with certainty. 
For there is no other way of acquiring knowledge.18 
Descartes’ method is based on intuition and deduc-
tion. His methodological skepticism leads him to 
doubt the truth of all messages and the trustfulness 
of all messengers, particularly those coming from the 
senses, including from someone “very powerful” 
(“potentissimum”) and “malign” (“malignum”) who 
would be willing to deceive him. In the second medi-
tation he tells how he found a firm foundation (“quod 
certum sit & inconcussum”) in a “knowledge” (“notit-
iam”) – the French text says: “cette notion & connais-
sance”19  – coming from himself that he himself 
“speaks out” (“a me profertur”), namely “Ego sum, 
ego existo”.20 All this is the product of a lonely medi-
tation, a secular practice closed as well as opposite to 
the Ignatian Spiritual Exercices and their meditation 
technologies. At the beginning of the first meditation 
Descartes writes: 
Today, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from 
all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions], and 
since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable 
retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and 
freely to the general overthrow of all my former o-
pinions.21 
Descartes methodological mistrust finds its end 
when he discovers in his own subjectivity the only 
messanger upon whom he can eventually rely, 
namely his own thinking in the process of thinking 
(“cogito”). The sender of this message is his own 
being as thinking substance. Human subjectivity as 
“res cogitans” becomes thus separated from the body 
as well as from the world as “res extensa.” Both are 
the ‘beyond’ over which the “res cogitans” strives to 
be the master. 
                                                 
18 René Descartes, Rules for The Direction Of The Mind, in: ibid. 
Philosophical Writings (Transl. Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter 
Thomas Geach, London 1954, 153-180). Online: 
http://faculty.uccb.ns.ca/philosophy/kbryson/rulesfor.htm.  
19 René Descartes, Oeuvres, op.cit., IX, 22. 
20 René Descartes, Oeuvres, op.cit., VII, 24-27. 
21 René Descartes, Meditations (Transl. J. Veitch) A Trilingual 
HTML Edition, ed. by David B. Manley and Charles S. Taylor. 
Online: http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/meditation1.html  
In the treaty Passions of the soul, dedicated to 
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, he underlines that 
there is no soul that “if well managed, cannot 
achieve an absolute power over its passions” (“estant 
bien conduite, acquerir un pouvoir absolu sur ses 
passions”).22 In the Discourse on Method he opposes 
“speculative philosophy” (“Philosophie speculatiue”) 
to scientific knowledge as the only “kind of practice” 
(“une pratique”) that allows us to become “masters 
and owners of nature” (“maistres & possesseurs de la 
Nature”).23 There is “the law” (“la loy”), he writes, 
that prohibits us from keeping secret this knowledge 
that can be used “for the welfare of everybody” (“le 
bien general de tous les hommes”), including per-
sonal health and “other goods of this life” (“les autres 
biens de cete vie”).24 “Even the spirit depends strong-
ly on the temperament and the organization of the 
bodily organs” (“mesme l’esprit depend si fort du 
temperament, & de la disposition des organes du 
corps”) in such a way that “if there is anything that 
makes human beings more wise and practical” (“s’il 
est possible de trouuer quelque moyen, qui rende 
communement les hommes plus sages & plus habiles 
qu’ilst n’ont esté iusques icy”) then it is ”medicine” 
(“la Medecine”) and not “moralities” (“les meurs”) 
or “speculative sciences” (“sciences speculatiues”).25 
Princess Elisabeth writes to Descartes that she 
cannot understand how an “immaterial being” (“un 
estre immateriel”) can move a body and be moved 
by it if it is not itself “informed” (“par information”) 
by the intelligence, that is to say, if the soul is not 
itself something material, a possibility that Descartes 
excludes. It is also difficult to understand, adds Prin-
cess Elisabeth, how the soul can be “governed” (“re-
gie”) by the body, having nothing in common with 
it.26 Princess Elisabeth argues from an Aristotelian 
perspective, where the soul “informs” the body 
building a unity with it. Descartes uses the same 
word, namely “inform,” when referring to the, as I 
would call it, angeletic relation between the ideas 
and the intellect. In this case ‘to inform’ it means 
that the ideas communicate (“informant”) some-
thing to the intellect when the intellect turns its 
attention to the pictures (“depictae”) located on 
                                                 
22 René Descartes, Oeuvres, op.cit., XI, Art. L, 68. 
23 René Descartes, Oeuvres, op.cit., VI, 61-62. 
24 Ibid. 61. 
25 Ibid. 61-62. 
26 René Descartes, Oeuvres, op.cit., III, 685. 






bodily imagination (“phantasia corporea”). Such 
pictures, Descartes adds, are not to be called ideas at 
all because ideas are ”forms of thought” (“cogita-
tionis formam”) and they are not “pictured” (“depic-
tae”) in some part of the brain.27 This remark is 
against the Aristotelian theory of the forming or ‘in-
formation’ of the senses as well as of the intellect that 
abstracts the ideas out of such ‘pictures’ or ‘phan-
tasmata’.28 According to Descartes, the mind com-
municates directly with the ideas, and in turn with 
the brain without any kind of substantial ‘in-
formational’ process.29  
In his answer to Princess Elisabeth, Descartes 
distinguishes between three kinds of ideas, one kind 
dealing with the soul that can be grasped only by the 
”pure intellect,” another kind dealing with the body 
that can be grasped by the intellect with the help of 
imagination, and finally those ideas concerning the 
unity of body and soul which remain problematic for 
the intellect and even for the imagination and can be 
grasped “very clearly” (“tres-clairement”), as Des-
cartes ironically remarks, by the senses. This is the 
reason why people “who never philosophize” (“ceux 
qui ne philosophent iamais”) have no doubt about 
how the soul moves the body, as they remain at the 
level of the senses where there is no such distinction 
between soul and body.30 But, in fact, the soul is like 
a “well-digger” who manages the pipes of the well31 
communicating with them through the ideas in his 
mind. As Peters states: 
The ‘doctrine of ideas,’ developed initially by Descartes, 
was central to early modern philosophy, both rationalist 
and empiricist. Abandoning the "direct perception" of the 
scholastics – the immediate communion of Intellect and 
Nature – Descartes interposed “ideas” between the two. 
An “idea” was something present to the mind, an image, 
copy, or representation, with a problematic relation to real 
things in the world. For empiricists (like Locke), the 
stream of ideas was the raw material from which genuine 
knowledge could be built; for rationalists (like Descartes), 
it was a veil of illusion, to be pierced by logic and reason.32 
                                                 
27 René Descartes, Oeuvres, op.cit., VII, 160-161. 
28 Rafael Capurro, Information, op.cit., 153. 
29 René Descartes, Oeuvres, op.cit., VII, 160-161. 
30 René Descartes, Oeuvres, op.cit., III, 691-692. 
31 René Descartes, Oeuvres, op.cit., XI, 131. 
32 John D. Peters, Information: Notes toward a critical history, in: 
Journal of Communication Inquiry 1988, 13. See also ibid.: Speak-
ing into the Air. A History of the Idea of Communication, Chica-
go 1999, 82. 
Descartes substituted the Aristotelian hylemorphism 
with an angeletic model using the communicational 
meaning of the concept of information that original-
ly, that is to say, in its Latin root (‘informatio'), 
meant ‘giving a (substantial) form to matter’ as well 
as ‘moulding the mind’ or ‘communicating some-
thing (new) to somebody’.33 Modernity retained only 
this last meaning.34 Descartes’ humanism is anthro-
pocentric. The sender of the ideas or (!) messages 
which the mind can eventually trust is the human 
mind itself based on the trust on its own existence. 
What is beyond the being of the thinking subject? 
No more and no less than the world itself. Descartes’ 
humanism is, as Heidegger remarks, worldless.35 
For Immanuel Kant human beings have two na-
tures. On the one hand, they are natural beings or 
“homo phaenomenon” subject to natural determin-
ism and, on the other hand, they are of “noumenal” 
nature or “homo noumenon,” that is to say, they 
belong to a transcendent or metaphysical communi-
ty of “intellectual beings” (“vernünftige Wesen”)36 
which build the “kingdom of ends in themselves” 
(“Reich der Zwecke”). Kant considers such a king-
dom “a useful and acceptable idea as an aid to rea-
sonable belief,” although we cannot know anything 
theoretically about it.37 In the Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals he stresses several times that 
humans are not the only “intellectual beings” or 
“persons” that have a “dignity” (“Würde”) based on 
their autonomy and not a “price” (“Preis”).38 All 
natural beings are heteronomous or subject to laws 
imposed on them, whereas “intellectual beings” are 
characterized by autonomy, that is to say, by the 
capacity to act on the basis of principles, inde-
pendently of any kind of (sensory) object of the will 
that would imply some kind of external influence on it. 
This means that freedom itself cannot be ex-
plained as if it were a natural phenomenon, for this 
would contradict its essence. There is a basic dualism 
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between natural laws and the autonomy of freedom. 
The moral law is the message that humans receive 
from their other nature or their “true self” (“das 
eigentliche Selbst”) commanding them to respect 
humanity in their own person.39 The moral law says 
what natural laws do, namely, to make being possi-
ble. Because humans belong to two separate worlds, 
the form of the moral law, namely “ought” (“das 
Sollen”), is not the same as for other “divine” beings 
who, due to the perfection of their will, do not need 
the (categorical) imperative: “The will in itself is 
necessarily in accordance with the law.”40 In other 
words, we are as “intelligible beings” the origin or 
sender of this message that “raises humans beyond 
themselves (as parts of the sensory world” (“was den 
Menschen über sich selbst (als einen Teil der Sin-
nenwelt) erhebt.”). Kant’s humanism is not anthro-
pocentric but reason-centered as far as humans are 
not the only kind of “intellectual beings” of which 
there might be “divine ones”.41 Being ourselves an 
“intellectual natural being”, there might be, we can 
infer, intellectual artificial beings or artificial agents, 
as we usually call them today. But from a Kantian 
perspective such agents can never become moral 
beings or members of the noumenal world.42 
Humans are autonomous and heteronomous be-
ings at the same time. As natural beings they are 
confronted with the fact of the moral law or the call 
of moral conscience coming from their “true self.” 
This messenger as well as its message are practically 
unconditional but theoretically problematic because 
we can have no theoretical knowledge about them. 
The moral law comes from beyond the sensory na-
ture, but it does not come from a god. It comes from 
the “noumenal” nature of humans. This ‘beyond’ is 
‘inside’ ourselves. The “moral law within me” (“das 
moralische Gesetz in mir”) as well as “the starry 
heaven above me” incite Kant’s great admiration.43 
Both are immediately related to his consciousness 
and his being in and beyond this world, without 
being “shrouded in obscurity or rapture”.44 The 
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“starry heaven” decenters our natural being while 
the moral law decenters the whole “sensory world” 
(“Sinnenwelt”).45 Kant’s practical defence of human 
autonomy is metaphysical. The laws of morality are 
grounded in human reason, but human reason is 
beyond nature. We are senders and receivers of our 
own freedom but this ‘we’ is not identical with our 
natural ‘we.’ Its messages are of a completely differ-
ent kind from the ones coming from the natural 
world that determine us as natural beings. The send-
er of such messages is within us, but beyond us as 
natural beings. Thanks to this hybrid nature as de-
terministic and free beings, we can intervene in 
natural processes, including our own nature. Charles 
Taylor summarizes the duality of Kantian anthro-
pology as follows: 
We have the power as rational agency to make the laws by 
which we live. This is something so greatly superior to the 
force of mere nature in us, in the form of desire, that when 
we contemplate it without distortion, we cannot but feel 
reverence (Achtung) for this power. The place of fullness 
is where we manage finally to give this power full reign, 
and so to live by it. We have a feeling of receptivity, when 
with our full sense of our own fragility and pathos as desiring 
beings, we look up to the power of law-giving with admiration 
and awe. But this doesn’t in the end mean that there is any 
reception from outside; the power is within; and the more we 
realize this power, the more we become aware that it is within, 
that morality must be autonomous and not heteronomous.46 
In the introduction to Anthropology from a Pragmat-
ic Point of View, Kant distinguishes between physio-
logical and pragmatic anthropology. Physiological 
anthropology deals with “what nature makes out of 
humans,” while pragmatic anthropology considers 
humans as free actors dealing with what “they make, 
or what they can and should make out of them-
selves” (“was er, als freihandelndes Wesen, aus sich 
selber macht, oder machen kann und soll”).47 Kant is 
skeptical about the possibilities of physiological 
anthropology. He writes: 
He who ponders natural causes, for example, the ones the 
faculty of memory may rest on, can speculate back and 
forth (in Cartesian style) about the traces of impressions 
remaining in the brain, but in doing so he must admit that 
in this play of his representations he is a mere observer 
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and must let nature run its course, for he does not know 
the cranial nerves and fibers, nor does he understand how 
to put them to use for his purposes. Therefore all theoreti-
cal speculation about this is a pure waste of time.48 
After two hundred years, things have changed. This 




Donna Haraway’s A Cyborg Manifesto49 and Kathe-
rine Hayles’ How we Became Posthuman50 are land-
marks of the early discussions dealing with the po-
tential changes of human self-manipulation brought 
about by modern science and technology such as 
digital technology, nanotechnology, brain research, 
and molecular biology, to name just a few. The ques-
tion about the humanness of the human and its 
‘beyond’ is not any more concerned with the rela-
tionship between the human and the divine as was 
the case with the classical humanisms in Antiquity, 
Renaissance and Reformation, nor with the self-
introspection of the subject as in Modernity, but 
with the hybridization of the human, particularly 
through the digital medium as well as through the 
possibilities to change the biological substrate of the 
human species. A common buzz-word for these 
issues is ‘human enhancement.’ According to Nick 
Bostrom, one of the main propagators of transhu-
manism through ‘human enhancement,’ the word 
“transhumanism” appears to have been used for the 
first time by 
Aldous Huxley’s brother, Julian Huxley, a distinguished 
biologist (who was also the first director general of UNE-
SCO and a founder of the World Wildlife Fund). In Reli-
gion without Revelation (1927), he wrote51: The human 
species can, if it wishes, transcend itself – not just sporadi-
cally, an individual here in one way, an individual there in 
another way – but in its entirety, as humanity. We need a 
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name for this new belief. Perhaps transhumanism will 
serve: man remaining man, but transcending himself, by 
realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature.52 
Other famous writers of scientific humanism in the 
20th century were Herbert G. Wells (1866-1946), 
Julian Huxley (1887-1975), John Desmond Bernal 
(1901-1971), and J.B.S. (John Burdon Sanderson) 
Haldane (1892-1964). Haldane inspired Norbert 
Wiener and such famous science-fiction authors as 
Arthur C. Clarke (1971-2008), and Robert Heinlein 
(1907-1988).53  
In the introduction to a recent book on human 
enhancement, Bostrom and Savulescu write: 
Are we good enough? If not, how may we improve oursel-
ves? Must we restrict ourselves to traditional methods like 
study and training? Or should we also use science to enhance 
some of our mental and physical capacities more directly?54 
These possibilities do not come from ‘above’ or (not 
solely) from ‘inside’ ourselves, but from scientific 
knowledge and the technologies intertwined with it. 
According to Bostrom and Savulescu, some of the 
ethical questions that arise are:  
Precisely what capacity is being enhanced in what ways? 
Who has access? Who makes the decisions? Within what 
cultural and sociopolitical context? At what cost to compe-
ting priorities? With what externalities? Justifiable ethical 
verdicts may only be attainable following a specification of 
these and other similarly contextual variables.55 
Transhumanism aims at transforming the human 
condition or at least some of its basic capabilities. It 
is an exaggerated humanism or hyperhumanism. 
Transhumanists talk about the future of the human 
species as a transhuman species. The rhetoric over-
sees that, under realistic premisses, it is a about some 
individuals of this species at least as far as such 
changes are not genetic. It is about the enhancement 
of (some) humans. The world remains unenhanced. 
This worldless self-transcendence is deeply rooted in 
Modernity as we have already seen in the case of 
Descartes. Even considering the possibilities opened 
by synthetic biology, the creation of a transhuman 
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species is extremely hypothetical and ethically prob-
lematic, to say the least.56 There is a naive optimism 
as well as an ideological belief in the transhumanist 
rhetoric that aims at surmounting the fragility and 
givenness of human existence.57 It also omits to talk 
not only about possible breakdowns of enhancing 
technologies, as in case of ‘any’ technology, but also 
of their possible turning into human ‘de-
enhancement’ as described, for instance, in works by 
Aldoux Huxley (1894-1963), Clive S. (Staples) Lewis 
(1898-1963), and J.R.R. (John Ronald Reuel) Tolkien 
(1892-1973).58  
Transhumanism and posthumanism are antithetical. 
The posthumanist debate is rooted in cultural cri-
tique and systems theory, particularly in the work of 
thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Donna Haraway, 
Katherine Hayles, Jacques Derrida, Niklas Luhmann, 
Bernard Stiegler, and Bruno Latour, to mention just 
a few. Posthumanists do not aim at enhancing but at 
decentering the human subject. As Cary Wolfe in his 
comprehensive study What is Posthumanism? remarks: 
posthumanism in my sense isn’t posthuman at all – in the 
sense of being ‘after’ our embodiment has been transcen-
ded – but is only posthumanist, in the sense that it opposes 
the fantasies of disembodiment and autonomy, inherited 
from humanism itself, that Hayles rightly criticizes.59 
On this line of thinking, Rosi Braidotti makes a 
stand for overcoming anthropocentrism by relating 
the concept of ‘bios’ or human life to the broader one 
of ‘zoe’ or life.60 But Braidotti is aware that the con-
tingency of history and contexts cannot be surveyed 
and assessed, and that we need a kind of web-like 
approach of different situations for the embedded 
and embodied subject. A distinction between ‘zoe’ 
and ‘bios’ does not imply necessarily a hierarchy. 
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Advocating that human life (‘bios’) as embedded 
beings is linked to all living (and non-living) beings 
(‘zoe’) does mean to have a commanding view of the 
dimensions related to the human self with its unique 
cultural and historical expressions that deserve care and 
respect no less than what we owe to all living beings.  
According to Bruno Latour “we have never been 
modern,” which means “we have never left tran-
scendence, that is to say, staying in the presence thanks 
to the mediation of the message (“nous n’avons jamais 
quitté  la transcendance, c’est-à-dire le maintien dans la 
présence par la médiation de l’envoi”).61 
There is no opposition between transcendence 
and immanence as in metaphysics. Both dimensions 
belong together. Every transcendence is an imma-
nent world-transcendence. Latour writes: ”The 
world of meaning and the world of being are one 
and the same world, namely the world of translation, 
substitution, delegation, passing on” (“Le monde du 
sens et la monde de l’être sont un seul et même 
monde, celui de la traduction, de la substitution, de 
la délégation, de la passe.”) 
In the Letter on Humanism from 1946 published 
in 1947, Heidegger answers Jean Beaufret’s question 
“How can we restore meaning to the word “Human-
ism” (“Comment redonner un sense au mot “Hu-
manisme”?”) with the remark: “I wonder whether 
that is necessary” (“Ich frage mich, ob das nötig 
ist.”).62 Why? Because of the danger that such a con-
cept implies in case the ‘humanum’ is conceived as 
some kind of perennial essence and this thinking 
becomes an ‘-ism’ that, like any other ‘-ism’, we 
should mistrust. To go beyond humanism(s) does 
not mean to be against the ‘humanum’ but against 
the fixation of the humanness of the human by fail-
ing to see the dimension that allows us to transform 
ourselves and the world. From this perspective, that 
Heidegger calls “fundamental ontology” – in opposi-
tion to “metaphysics” as well as to “ontology” under-
stood within the framework of metaphysics63 – he 
proposes to decenter human self-understanding that 
aims at fixing essentialistically or existentialistically 
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the humanness of the human, forgetting the open 
and finite dimension of Being.  
Turning the relation between essence and exist-
ence, as in Sartre’s Existentialism is a Humanism – a 
conference held in Paris in October 1945 and pub-
lished in 194664 – is still essentialistic.65 Thinking 
beyond humanisms means learning to see “the true 
dignity of the human being” (“die eigentliche Würde 
des Menschen”) from a different perspective than that 
of the dominance of beings, leading to an apparently 
unquestionability of their being.66 Deryck Beyleveld 
and Roger Brownsword define human dignity  
“as a particular practical attitude to be cultivated in the 
face of human finitude and vulnerability (and, concomi-
tantly, the natural and social adversity that characterizes 
the human condition).”67  
Heidegger teaches us to see ourselves as being-in-
the-world from the perspective of Being. Being does 
not mean, as Thomas Sheehan rightly stresses, the 
“Big Being” of metaphysics, but the finite transcend-
ence of open possibilities ‘as what’ things can be 
understood.68 For a finite transcendence this ‘as’ can 
never be fully understood. Every interpretation of 
something ‘as’ something implies a retreat of other 
possibilities. We are as knowers and agents decen-
tered by the finite givenness of the being of beings, 
but also open to such potentialities as well.  
Heidegger’s formula for such finite transcend-
ence, namely “Dasein” or the ‘here’ of Being, seems 
at first sight anthropocentric if the interpreter does 
not perform the ‘anamorphic switch’ from what IS to 
AS what something is being seen. Once this unusual 
change of perspective is performed it is possible to 
see what the normal “ontic” perspective oversees, 
namely Being.69 A famous example of such anamor-
phic blindness is the anamorphic skull in Hans Hol-
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bein’s painting The Ambassadors.70 Being is the un-
canny ‘as’ seen from the natural attitude.71 It is the 
dimension that decenters the natural anthropocen-
tric attitude of humanisms that consider it as noise 
and conceives humans only and originally as senders 
and receivers of messages about beings. From this 
uncanny perspective, humans ‘are’ messengers of 
Being and the message they pass on is the world, that 
is to say, a possible way in which messages about 
beings can be interpreted ‘as’ being this or that with-
in a framework of understanding. Being gives us ‘as’ 
messengers the potentiality to transcend a given ‘as’ 
of things or a possible world disclosure. An example 
of this transcendence are paradigm changes in sci-
ence72 when ‘facts’ that are supposed to support and 
prove a theory are re-interpreted from another, 
unusual perspective from which now presupposi-
tions, instruments, institutions, traditions, etc. are 
put into question or “falsified”.73 
The possibility of questioning not only a theory 
but a world-openness can lead to strong opposition 
by the defenders of the ‘status quo’ including the 
condemnation and disparagement of the messenger, 
as in the case of Socrates and many others. This 
opens the question about the ethical criteria for 
making a distinction between a messenger of Being 
and its opposite, namely a charlatan, with all degrees 
in between. The Socratic criterion for this difficult 
ethical task of “discernment of spirits” (Ignatius of 
Loyola) – always endangered by manipulation and 
self-deception – is whether the messenger holds on 
to the openness of Being or proclaims an absolute 
truth that eventually turns into a political, religious, 
or (pseudo-) scientific ideology, with all degrees in 
between. In this case the messenger turns into an 
almighty sender. This is the reason why ‘-isms’ that 
veil and unveil such fixation should be ontologically, 
that is to say, ethically mistrusted. If today’s world-
openness is characterized by the horizon of digitiza-
bility of beings – which my colleague, the Australian 
philosopher Michael Eldred, and I call digital ontol-
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ogy74 – then there is the danger that those who pro-
claim or follow this call of being might believe that 
things ‘are’ only as seen from this perspective. I call 
this kind of ideology digital metaphysics. 
Every being ‘as’ a being shares the world-
openness and ‘is’ a messenger. Humans as messen-
gers of Being allow a hospitality for beings to dis-
close and pass on through the world-openness – 
Pico’s “creaturarum internuntium” –, sharing it in 
different ways without ever occupying a center, in 
which case the openness turns closed and the dy-
namic of the ‘as’ is blocked.75 After Niklas Luhmann 
we know that a message (“Mitteilung”) is a meaning-
offer and has no definite content until the receiver 
makes his/her choices.76 Cybernetics has taught us 
that every receiver can turn into a sender. Lacanian 
psychoanalysis underlines the indefinite and inde-
finable nature of “the object” addressed in the long 
run by human desire.77 The psychoanalyst ‘as’ a 
messenger enables the analysand to take a detour to 
himself/herself. This relationship, called the trans-
ference phenomenon, takes place from both sides.78   
In Being and Time Heidegger calls this relation-
ship the “hermeneutic circle” (Heidegger 1976). 
Following some hints in his late writings,79 we can 
say that the “hermeneutic circle” is in fact an ‘ange-
letic circle’ insofar as it concerns the relation be-
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tween senders, messagers, messages and receivers. 
As seen from the uncanny perspective, Being is 
sender and receiver insofar as a world is always a 
potential perspective for understanding. Heidegger 
writes: “The messenger must already come from the 
message. But he must also already have gone towa-
rds it.” (“Der Botengänger muß schon von der Bot-
schaft herkommen. Er muß aber auch schon auf sie 
zugegangen sein.“).80 The usual German term for 
“messenger” being ‘Bote,‘ ‘Botengänger‘ seems to 
underline the pure dynamic fact of bringing the 
message. It is the opposite to the kind of messengers 
called ambassadors (“Botschafter”). There is a be-
longing-together of Being and “Dasein” or humans 
as messengers that Heidegger calls “Ereignis”.81 It 
means that we cannot fail to interpret the meaning 
of Being, since our being is being-in-the-world. 
From the uncanny perspective we live in a heteron-
omous relation to Being. We are, in Lacanian terms, 
a divided or “crossed” (“barré”) subject82 or a subject 
characterized by the finitude of its being addressed 
by the Other83 that can annihilate him/her. Loneli-
ness and anxiety are moods through which we unveil 
the truth, that is to say, the finitude of being-in-the-
world-with-others. We receive and pass on – and 
sometimes try to bypass – the message of Being. 
 
Conclusion 
Who are we at the beginning of the 21st century? We 
are a message society, that is to say, a humanity 
linked via various means of communication, particu-
larly through digital networks enabling synergies of 
various kinds for human inter-plays within and 
beyond political, ethnic, economic and cultural 
borders and differences, but mostly at war because 
of such borders and differences. At the same time, 
humanity is at war with nature, leading to ecolog-
ical disasters that could end with ecocide.84 In 
other words, we are a ‘de iure’ united humanity, as 
far as we as political agents belong to common global 
institutions such as the United Nations, sign univer-
sal declarations and promote global actions. But we 
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are also a ‘de facto’ divided humanity. Between these 
two poles there are not only various forms of local 
and global conflicts and collaboration, but also a 
complex cultural history that includes our rela-
tionship to nature. Nature has brought about 
biodiversity. We humans have produced cultural 
diversity reflected in academic disciplines we call 
the humanities. If we want to avoid the pitfalls of 
humanisms, we must pay attention to the uncanny 
potentiality of the ‘as’ coming from Being, beyond a 
fixation on humanisms, in order to render hospitali-
ty to humanities in the double sense of the word.  
The ethics of universalism can be transformed into 
one of openness and situatedness. The autonomy of 
the subject can become the capacity of messengers to 
pass on the message of finitude that in the Buddhist 
tradition is called compassion. Instead of an ethics of 
moral imperatives coming from within and beyond 
the individual, we can develop an ethics of hospitali-
ty and care coming from in-between the plurality of 
humanities articulated in the ‘here’ of a shared 
world. Instead of looking for strategies of fleeing or 
mastering the world, it is up to us to take care of it 
beyond utilitarian calculations. Such an ethics is not 
about universal laws, but about messages of hope. In 
short, it is not primarily about us but about a shared 
world. We are called to make sense of Being. It is an 
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